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Abstract
We provide causal evidence that German savings banks – where local politi-
cians are by law involved in their management – systematically adjust lend-
ing policies in response to local electoral cycles. The different timing of
county elections across states and the existence of a control group of coop-
erative banks – that are very similar to savings banks but lack their political
connectedness – allow for clean identification of causal effects of county
elections on savings banks’ lending. These effects are economically mean-
ingful and robust to various specifications. Moreover, politically induced
lending increases in incumbent party entrenchment and in the contested-
ness of upcoming elections.
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1 Introduction
Government control over enterprises is widespread across the world. While early
authors, following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), argued that state-ownership is
a second-best optimal policy to overcome market failure, the more recent lit-
erature, following Shleifer and Vishny (1994), opposes this view: It argues that
politicians use these firms to extract private rents for themselves or their support-
ers, thereby creating rather than eliminating social inefficiencies. Government
control is particularly prominent in the banking sector whose role in the recent
financial crises has become the subject of increased scrutiny (see for example
Schwartz, 2009). For reasons like these, it is important to understand the conse-
quences of government control over financial institutions.
There is already evidence for rent extraction in the public banking sector
(see La Porta et al. (2002); Sapienza (2004); Dinç (2005); Khwaja and Mian
(2005); Cole (2009); Carvalho (2012)) but it is restricted to developing and
emerging countries with notoriously weak institutions. In this paper, we present
causal evidence for substantial distortions in the lending behavior of government-
controlled banks in a highly developed country with a reputation for efficient
institutions: Lending policies of German savings banks closely track the local
electoral cycle.1 Their aggregate credit stock systematically increases by roughly
2%, corresponding to an average of EUR 56.9 million, in the run-up to local
elections. Assuming an average credit tenure of 3 to 4 years, this translates into
a 6% to 8% increase in newly extended loans.
These results are robust to various empirical specifications and in line with
the hypothesis that local savings banks serve the interests of county-level politi-
cians who push for more lavish pre-election lending in hopes of boosting eco-
nomic conditions, the mood of the electorate, and, ultimately, their re-election
prospects.2 Considering that savings banks constitute an important pillar of the
German banking system and that they are the main lender to private customers
1While there are various ways to measure the quality of institutions, the Transparency Inter-
national Corruption Index is a very prominent example. Germany ranks well in the least corrupt
decile of this measure (see: http://www.transparency.org).
2Peltzman (1987) and Wolfers (2007) document that economic conditions are important for
re-election prospects and Smart and Sturm (2007) provide evidence that politicians react to re-
election incentives.
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and small to medium sized businesses (SMEs), it is worrisome to find their poli-
cies substantially distorted.3
The political tinkering that we document is possible due to a specific institu-
tional feature of the German banking sector: For historical reasons, and with very
few exceptions, each German county is matched with one savings bank that is
effectively controlled by local politicians. In particular, key supervision functions
in the bank’s management, specifically in credit decisions, are filled with county
politicians. Taking advantage of a high degree of variation in electoral timing,
we achieve clean identification of causal effects: Local elections in Germany are
synchronized at the state level but not across states and in general are held on dif-
ferent days than state elections. In addition, German cooperative banks – which
have the same regional organization and a similar business model as savings
banks, but are not politically controlled – are a well-suited control group. Hence,
we are able to exploit both intertemporal variation, as banks are repeatedly
treated with an election over the course of time, and cross-sectional variation, as
in any given year some banks are treated and others are not. Econometrically, we
conduct difference-in-difference (DD) as well as triple-difference (DDD) estima-
tion embedded in a fixed-effects panel setup. Importantly, we demonstrate that
pre-election increases in lending are not demand-driven, as they do neither oc-
cur prior to state elections (where standard political business cycle policies might
be in place and spur credit demand) nor for cooperative banks (that should be
similarly affected by any increase in credit demand).
Our rich, in large parts hand-collected, data combines unusually comprehen-
sive bank data (both with respect to its cross-section and time series dimensions)
with detailed information on German county elections that has, thus far, not been
available for research. This degree of detail allows us to study the role of polit-
3In 2011, the more than 400 German savings banks employed 245,969 people and controlled
total assets of EUR 1,098 billion. In the EUR 228.2 billion consumer credit market, the 25% market
share of savings banks is comparable to a 23% share of cooperative banks and much larger than
the 7% share of all major commercial banks, such as Deutsche Bank or Commerzbank. In the
substantially larger market for corporate loans (including credit to the self-employed), which
totaled EUR 1,356 billion, savings banks had a market share of 24%, whereas cooperative banks
held 15%, and all large commercial banks 13% of the market. Apart from these aggregate numbers,
some savings banks are also of impressive size individually. For instance, in 2011 Stadtsparkasse
Munich extended credit of EUR 9.6 billion. (All numbers taken from the 2011 financial report of
the German federal savings bank association.)
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ical competition in keeping electoral distortions of lending in check. We show
that excess pre-election lending is particularly pronounced in districts that are
historically tightly controlled by an incumbent party (increasing the ability to
influence bank policies) but that face a close upcoming election (providing the
incentive to distort lending). In those counties that were historically entrenched
but now face close races the extent of politically induced excessive lending in-
creases to 5.6% of the aggregate credit stock while the excess lending is hardly
present in counties that were historically not particularly entrenched and that do
not face tight races. This suggests that not only potential political competition
per se – guaranteed by a strong institutional environment – but also the intensity
of actual electoral competition is decisive in determining the scope of political
rent-extraction.
The above results are extremely robust. They remain significant and substan-
tial using a wide range of controls (like total assets and capital ratios at the bank
level or local GDP and population levels at the county level), using different def-
initions of the dependent variable, allowing for alternative error structures, and
varying the sample composition by excluding different subsets of years, banks,
or states.
The paper relates to several literatures. The first is the theory of (opportunis-
tic) political business cycles (PBC) pioneered by Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae
(1977), which describes politicians’ incentives to enact expansionary fiscal poli-
cies shortly before elections to boost their own popularity, only to offset them
with contractionary policies afterwards. This theory has received empirical sup-
port in numerous studies (Alesina et al., 1997; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya,
2004; Mitchell and Willett, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2007; and Schneider, 2010
among others).
A more immediate connection exists to a strand of the finance literature that
documents distortions in the behavior of government-controlled banks. Rather
than directly implementing policies that further their interests, politicians use
financial institutions as a vehicle to this end. La Porta et al. (2002) find that gov-
ernment ownership of banks is most prominent in low-income countries with
underdeveloped financial systems, generally inefficient governments, and poor
protection of property rights. Moreover, government ownership of banks is as-
sociated with lower growth of per capita income. Sapienza (2004) studies the
effects of government ownership on bank lending in Italy and shows that, con-
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trolling for firm characteristics, state-owned banks charge lower interest rates
than private banks. Furthermore, the effect on interest rates is more pronounced
if the political party affiliated with a given firm is stronger in the area in which
the firm is borrowing. Similarly, Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that politically
connected firms in Pakistan have easier access to credit from government banks.
Dinç (2005) shows that the lending behavior of public banks in developing coun-
tries depends on the timing of elections. Cole (2009) finds that lending for agri-
cultural loans by government-owned banks in India is related to the electoral cy-
cle, and that the largest increases in lending occur in districts in which elections
are close. Carvalho (2012) documents that Brazilian firms eligible for govern-
ment bank lending expand employment in politically contested regions prior to
elections by shifting employment from other regions. Yet, given that all of this af-
firmative evidence is limited to countries with weak institutional environments,
this paper is the first to provide clean causal evidence for distorted lending poli-
cies in a country that is often cited as an epitome of political efficiency.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The institutional back-
ground is described in section 2. Section 3 specifies the research hypotheses and
testable predictions. Section 4 discusses merits and limitations of our data while
methodological issues and the identification strategy are presented in section 5.
Section 6 contains the empirical results, and section 7 reports robustness tests.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional background
This section provides the institutional details relevant for evaluating the identifi-
cation strategy. We lay out the case for why savings banks are a prime example of
politically controlled firms, why cooperative banks are a suitable control group,
and how the German electoral system allows to cleanly estimate causal effects
of elections on bank lending.
4In fact, Dinç (2005) fails to find an electoral effect on lending in developed economies. The
discrepancy between our results and those of Dinç is likely explained by our focus on county
(instead of general) elections, reflecting that in the German case, political influence on banks is at
the local and not the federal level.
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2.1 The German electoral system
Germany has a federal system with three layers of government: the federal state,
the 16 states (Bundesländer), and 399 county districts (consisting of 292 rural
counties (Landkreise) and 107 urban municipalities (Kreisfreie Städte)). Each
layer has specific powers and responsibilities as well as separate legislative bod-
ies, which are elected in regular intervals: every 4 years at the federal level, every
4 to 5 years at the state level and every 4 to 6 years at the county level. Since con-
trol over savings banks is exerted by county-level governments (see section 2.2
below), we focus on the latter class of elections.
Each county district has its own legislative body. While elections of these lo-
cal parliaments are coordinated at the state level – that is, within a state they
all take place on the same election day – they provide a great deal of variation
in electoral timing. For one, county election dates generally deviate from dates
of federal or state elections, i.e. as a rule they are not held on the same day.
Moreover, county election dates differ across states, neatly dispersing electoral
events over several years. Variation is further increased by the fact that the in-
tervals between elections are not the same for all states: While in most cases
elections are held every 5 years, legislative periods are shorter for Bremen and
Hamburg (4 years) and longer for Bavaria (6 years). In addition, the electoral
laws of Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein saw a change in the early 1990s, replac-
ing a 4-year with a 5-year interval. In all states the electoral system is one of
proportional representation with a minimum vote share requirement.
2.2 The German banking system
The German banking systems consists of three pillars (Drei-Säulen-Modell): pri-
vate banks, savings banks (Sparkassen), and cooperative banks (Genossenschafts-
banken). Whereas private banks are best described as profit-maximizing firms,
savings banks and cooperative banks are legally bound to also pursue welfare
enhancing policies, in particular within the region they operate in. According to
the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), in 2011 there were roughly
1,100 cooperative banks, 426 savings banks and 218 private banks operating
in Germany. Because savings banks and cooperative banks are the focus of the
empirical analysis, these two bank types will be described in more detail.
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Savings banks
As of 2011, German savings banks held combined assets of well over one trillion
EUR, of which 677 billion EUR represent lending to the private sector. This trans-
lates into market shares of 24% and 25% of all lending to businesses and private
households, respectively.5 Much like the German government system, the struc-
ture of the German savings bank sector is one of three levels: On the local level
there are the individual savings banks. At the state level there are associations
(Sparkassen- und Giroverbände) to realize economies of scale for operative tasks.
On the federal level, a further association (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Girover-
band (DSGV)) is primarily responsible for representing the interests of savings
banks towards the federal government and international institutions. All rele-
vant decisions regarding the business policies of an individual savings bank are
autonomously taken at the local level. Due to their local structure, and imposed
by law, the savings banks’ operations have a strong focus on the region they op-
erate in (Regionalprinzip). Their main clientele are private customers and local
businesses. In particular, savings banks are the main creditor for SMEs – the so
called Mittelstand – that are traditionally considered the backbone of the German
economy.6
The first “modern” savings banks in Germany were founded by local gov-
ernments in the late 18th century in Northern Germany. Initially, the number
of savings banks increased from 300 (in 1836) to more than 3,000 (in 1913).
Gradually, this number was reduced when for efficiency reasons neighboring lo-
cal institutions merged (for more details see Guinnane, 2002). Today there exist
426 savings banks, roughly matching each county with one savings bank.7
Given this historic origin, local governments still hold significant sway over
the management of savings banks, in particular their lending activities:8 Coun-
5All numbers taken from the 2011 financial report of the German federal savings bank associ-
ation
6According to the German Institute of SME Research (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn),
roughly 38% of the entire German business volume is generated by SMEs and they employ almost
two thirds of the German work force.
7A slight mismatch between the number of electoral districts and the number of savings banks
is explained by temporally imperfect synchronization of the merging of districts and the merging
of savings banks.
8An additional reason for close governmental control lies in the fact that German law installs
public guarantee obligation (Gewährträgerhaftung) for public institutions. This rule provides that
the creditor is going to be reimbursed by the government in case the public institution is not
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ties have the formal right to send representatives into the board of directors
(Sparkassenverwaltungsrat) and the central credit committee (Kreditausschuss)
of the respective savings bank. As a result, their members are to a large degree
composed of county parliament members, roughly reflecting the relative political
powers in the electoral district. On top of that, the chairmen of both chambers is,
as a rule, the political representative of the respective county. By law, the direc-
tors are not bound by an imperative mandate but are supposed to only consider
the greater good of the savings bank. While this form of political representa-
tion may plausibly foster the creation of informal but meaningful ties between
policymakers and bank executives, some of the leverage is even of statutory na-
ture: Besides having general authority to establish guidelines, board members
have substantial influence over credit decisions that exceed the authority of the
savings bank’s management, as the board of directors or the central credit com-
mittee have to vote on credits that are either large in size or considered rather
risky (see Schlierbach, 2003 and Güde, 1995).
Cooperative banks
The first cooperative banks in Germany were founded by Franz Hermann Schulze-
Delitzsch und Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen in the middle of the 19th century.
They are organized as cooperatives, making each customer also a “member” of
the bank. Much like savings banks, they are locally organized, with one to three
cooperative banks in every county. Their main clientele are private customers
and local businesses.
Most local cooperative banks are organized in a federal association of coop-
erative banks (Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken).
Cooperative banks are not covered by the public guarantee obligation but their
federal association provides an insurance fund to provide deposit guarantees.
Since cooperative banks are independent from governmental institutions and are
not protected by public guarantees, politicians have no formal way to influence
cooperative banks’ business policies.
able to live up to its contractual obligations. Having been founded by the respective counties,
German savings banks were considered public institutions, and were covered by a municipal public
guarantee obligation. The European Court of Justice deemed this an obstacle to competition in
retail banking and savings banks were exempted from public guarantee obligation as of July 19,
2005. See Gropp et al. (2011) or Fischer et al. (2011) for studies on the effect of this decision on
savings banks’ and Landesbanks’ risk taking, respectively.
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Cooperative banks constitute a well-suited control group as they have a simi-
lar regional structure as savings banks, cater to a comparable clientele, and have
an almost identical business model (Engerer, 2006 and Hakenes and Schnabel,
2006)9 – but they are exempted from the direct control local politicians hold
over savings banks’ business policies.
Note that, in stark contrast to this, private banks differ greatly from savings
banks, rendering them unsuitable as a control group. First, their business model
solely focuses on profit-maximization and is unrestricted by welfare considera-
tions. Second, their outreach is usually not confined to a specific region. Third,
their client structure is much less rooted in private households and small firms.
Fourth, and most importantly from a practical point of view, their spatial repre-
sentation does not consist of independent regional units but of mere branches
that are legally part of operational headquarters and for which no disaggregated
data is available to researchers.
3 Main hypothesis and testable predictions
The main hypothesis this paper seeks to test is whether local savings banks ex-
pand lending in the run-up to elections. Local politicians would want to induce
banks to do so in hopes of swaying their re-election prospects. As described in
section 2, the institutional environment creates the ability to influence lending as
it installs local politicians as members and even chairs of the board of directors
of savings banks. Given this board’s substantial authority that goes much beyond
rubber-stamping decisions made by the bank’s management, politicians have an
immediate path to affecting the lending activities of their local savings bank.
Besides this general opportunity, there is also an incentive for policymakers to
artificially expand lending in their districts: As established in the literature (see,
for example, Smart and Sturm, 2007), politicians care about re-election and (per-
ceived) economic conditions are an important determinant for the prospects of
winning another term (see Peltzman, 1987 and Wolfers, 2007). Pushing for more
9Comparing the regulating laws (our translation) describing the purposes of cooperative banks
(here for Volksbanken) and savings banks (here for Baden-Württemberg) highlights that they share
basically the same objectives:
§1(1) Genossenschaftsgesetz: “[...] to foster the income or the enterprise of the members [...]”
§6(1) Sparkassengesetz Baden-Württemberg: “[...] to ensure the provision with money and credit
in their region in particular for SMEs [...]”
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generous lending policies is one channel through which politicians can spur the
local economy: Constituents will be more satisfied when they are not troubled by
credit rationing and loans to SMEs may be paramount for the creation or preser-
vation of employment in the district. Also not directly affected voters will, ceteris
paribus, interpret better economic conditions as indicative for better economic
policies implemented by incumbent politicians. The legally mandated regional
focus of savings banks helps local politicians to target the benefits of these poli-
cies as borrowers will almost certainly live – and vote – in the region. Moreover,
the described channel is attractive to the politician as the potential costs of this
intervention (for instance, lower quality and, hence, higher default rates for the
marginally granted credits) are deferred until the loans in question mature, that
is, the negative fallout is not instantly visible and may in fact never be traced
back to the responsible politicians.
Following the argument made above, lending increases should be exclusive
to savings banks whereas financial institutions that lack the described political
connection – as is the case for cooperative banks – should not be affected. Sim-
ilarly, excess lending should not occur in the run-up to elections of state par-
liaments, where local politicians are not exposed to the risk of displacement.10
Using cooperative banks as a control group and running placebo tests with state
elections allows us to distinguish politically motivated lending from an increase
in demand for credit in response to real economic growth around election years,
caused, for example, by traditional political spending cycles. These traditional
expansionary policies should equally affect cooperative bank lending and should
also be present for elections of higher levels of government.11
In terms of the timing of bank lending distortions, politically motivated lend-
ing should be focused on election seasons rather than equally distributed through-
out the legislative period. This way, any negative short-term consequences (e.g.,
higher default rates for the marginal loans) of expanding credit are unlikely to
be visible before the election date. Moreover, if voters are myopic, political gain
10Recall that it is local politicians who are granted membership in the bank’s board of directors.
While a few exceptions from this rule (with members of state parliaments being granted access as
well) exist, any potential effect should be considerably weaker than that of county elections.
11Note that German states control a substantially larger share of public spending as compared
to counties (in 2011, EUR 319 billion vs. EUR 195 billion). Hence, the absence of a state election
effect further strengthens the case that credit expansion is not driven by standard expansionary
pre-election policies.
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is maximal if the instrument is applied in the run-up to elections. Importantly,
any lending increase should not extend to post-election periods – at least until
the next electoral lending cycle starts unfolding – since incentives to allure voters
vanish once the polls are closed.
Finally, the strength of any election effect should depend in two partly coun-
tervailing ways on the degree of electoral competition politicians face in their
district:
On the one hand, the ability of politicians to influence savings bank lend-
ing should be curbed by high general electoral competition that has led to close
elections in the past. The rationale for this argument is one of entrenchment: A
competitive political environment will be reflected in a balanced composition of
the bank’s board of directors, reducing the likelihood of collusion among board
members who represent rivaling political parties. As a result, regular changes in
power and slim majorities in the past would limit the scope of electoral lending
cycles. On the other hand, the second effect of electoral competition – shaping
the incentive to distort bank operations – depends of the contestedness of current
elections. Politically motivated lending is presumably costly for savings banks as
extramarginal loans are likely to be of worse quality and carry higher risks of de-
fault. Hence, incumbent politicians should not make much use of this distorting
instrument unless they face a close election.
Based on these general arguments we formulate four specific testable predic-
tions:
Prediction 1: Election effect. In the run-up to county elections, local savings
banks systematically increase lending. At the same time, there is no increase
in pre-election lending for cooperative banks that are very similar to savings
banks but are not politically controlled.
Prediction 2: Election type. Elections at the state level have no systematic im-
pact on credit extension since politicians from this level of government are
not institutionally connected with local savings banks.
Prediction 3: Lending cycle. Politically motivated increases in lending occur ex-
clusively in the run-up to elections. After elections, lending quickly returns
to its normal level before a new lending is initiated.
Prediction 4: Electoral competition. The electoral lending cycle is stronger in
districts with high levels of entrenchment of the incumbent party and high
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levels of current electoral contestedness, increasing opportunities and in-
centives, respectively, for politicians to distort bank policies.
Whether these predictions are consistent with the data is investigated in sec-
tion 6. Before turning to this analysis, however, we continue with the description
of the data and discuss some caveats concerning the feasibility of testing these
predictions with the information at hand.
4 Data
We use a novel, in large parts hand-collected, dataset that combines information
from multiple sources. The observational units are German savings and coop-
erative banks. This bank data is merged with information on county and state
elections as well as with macroeconomic and demographic data on the county
level. Overall, our working sample includes data for 1,735 banks that operated
in 14 out of 16 German states, during the years between 1987 and 2009.12
4.1 Bank data
The source of our bank data is Hoppenstedt, a business data provider that hosts
the largest commercial database for balance sheets and annual reports in Ger-
many. The main advantage of Hoppenstedt, compared to similar commercial
databases such as Bankscope, are the ample dimensions (both cross-sectionally
and intertemporally) the sample provides: It covers virtually all savings banks
and a large fraction of cooperative banks that operated in Germany between
1987 and 2009.13 The data covers a total of 521 savings banks (8,626 bank-year
observations) and 1,214 cooperative banks (10,351 bank-year observations).14
Note that these numbers include a sizable number of banks that exited or en-
tered the sample due to bank mergers. The average time savings banks remain
12We leave out the formerly GDR states of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt which experienced multi-
ple territorial reforms post-unification in 1990 that radically altered the composition of electoral
districts. See section 4.2 below for details.
13We ran several internal consistency checks to ensure that the Hoppenstedt data be of compara-
ble quality to that of Bankscope.
14Eight savings banks in our sample – the so-called Freie Sparkassen – are incorporated and do
not grant politicians access to their governing boards. They are treated as cooperative banks in
the main specification. Robustness analysis not presented here, shows that none of the results is
driven by this recoding.
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in the sample is 17 years, whereas the average cooperative bank is only observ-
able for roughly 9 consecutive years. This reflects that our panel is considerably
less balanced for cooperative banks, as a large fraction is only covered by the
sample since the early 2000s. To ensure that the results are not driven by these
sample characteristics, we perform robustness checks by varying the degree of
panel balancedness in section 7.3.
All information is taken from official balance sheets. The key variables are the
bank’s overall lending position, total assets, and the capital ratio. All monetary
positions are deflated and measured in 1995 EUR. A look at the panel charac-
teristics reveals that for all items between-variation is substantially greater than
within-variation.
4.2 Election data
A database that combines information on German county elections in any com-
prehensive way does not exist. Even at the state-level, the collection of local
electoral data is the clear exception. For this reason, we created a unique dataset
by collecting all necessary information ourselves. To this end, we contacted re-
gional statistical offices, the respective counties, and historical archives all over
Germany. As a result of this labor intensive project, we have collected data for all
399 German counties. Given that the states of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, that
had belonged to the GDR and enter the data only in 1990, experienced multiple
territorial reforms that radically altered the composition of electoral districts, we
dropped observations of these two states, reducing the number of counties with
usable information to 373. This election data covers the years between 1970
and 2009 for the 11 western states and the post-reunification years between
1990 and 2009 for the five eastern states. Yet, since the political data is merged
with the aforementioned bank data, the maximum interval for analysis is effec-
tively reduced to 1987–2009. During this time span, the relative states held 4
to 7 elections of local legislative bodies. The dataset contains information on
election dates, election results (measured in vote shares), the names and party
affiliations of incumbents and election winners, and whether there was a change
in power. To enable empirical testing of prediction 2, we have also added dates
and outcomes of state elections.
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4.3 District data
Finally, to warrant better control for confounding factors and to increase statis-
tical precision, the sample is augmented with time-varying macroeconomic and
demographic information at the district level, which are available at the German
Federal Statistic Office (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland). These include pop-
ulation size, GDP, unemployment, public spending and expenditure, public debt,
as well as firm creation, closures and bankruptcies. Once again, all monetary val-
ues are converted to 1995 EUR. Available time spans vary significantly among
these variables so that the addition of certain control variables results in signifi-
cant loss of sample size. The longest time series are available for GDP, population
size and unemployment, spanning from the early 1990s to 2009. The collection
of the other variables by the Statistic Office sets in considerably later. For these
reasons, the effective time-span covered by the main econometric specification
presented in section 5 covers the years between 1993 and 2009, whereas time
spans of deviating length are analyzed for robustness in section 7.3.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis are presented in table 1.
Overall, our data is substantially right-skewed, which is why the main empirical
specification presented below makes use of log-transformed data. As is evident
from panel A, savings banks are on average larger than their cooperative counter-
parts. Judging from the ratio of loans and total assets, both bank types clearly set
their business focus on lending operations: The average loan position of savings
banks makes up 70% of the entire balance sheet, while that number is slightly
higher for cooperative banks, which devote almost 73% of their operations to
providing credit. Furthermore, the capital ratio seems to be mildly, but systemat-
ically, larger for cooperative banks.
A look at panel B reveals that counties in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria
are clearly dominated by conservative parties – Bavaria’s Christlich-Soziale Union
(CSU) and its sister party, Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU), which competes
in the rest of Germany – whereas the other states see a closer gap between the
main political rivals: Germany’s largest left-of-center party, Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands (SPD), generally fares very poorly and incumbent dominance
appears to be much stronger in the two aforementioned states, suggesting a
13
Table 1. Variables used for analysis
Summary statistics
Variables Total BW BV BE BB BR HA HS LS MW NW RP SL SH TH
Panel A: Banks
Bank-year obs. 18,977 3,722 4,414 46 260 85 81 1,658 1,907 126 3,983 1,274 337 692 392
Savings banks
- No. of banks 521 73 103 1 14 3 2 53 60 6 123 40 9 19 18
- Total assets 1.908 2.295 1.658 75.091 1.589 2.669 9.662 2.453 1.635 1.293 2.157 1.480 1.943 1.834 1.083
(2.176) (1.920) (1.579) (33.015) (1.589) (2.894) (13.181) (3.086) (1.738) (1.024) (3.045) (0.799) (1.603) (1.300) (0.531)
- Loans 1.327 1.588 1.148 56.127 0.721 2.069 7.726 1.726 1.203 0.729 1.509 1.037 1,404 1,423 0,575
(1.580) (1.332) (1.078) (27.409) (0.633) (2.362) (10.742) (2.170) (1.332) (0.580) (2.272) (0.605) (1.185) (1.051) (0.344)
- Capital ratio 0.046 0.043 0.048 0.030 0.038 0.049 0.046 0.045 0.050 0.039 0.047 0.046 0.044 0.046 0.039
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.030) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Cooperative banks
- No. of banks 1,214 250 342 1 11 3 3 97 135 7 206 77 18 44 17
- Total assets 0.883 0.645 0.616 8.563 0.297 0.469 0.956 0.753 0.448 0.345 0.900 0.555 0.610 0.756 0.331
(4.261) (0.676) (2.319) (2.798) (0.087) (0.154) (0.346) (0.878) 0.397) (0.131) (2.379) (0.627) (0.625) (0.886) (0.159)
- Loans 0.650 0.478 0.462 6.376 0.166 0.352 0.728 0.561 0.322 0.227 0.629 0.435 0.483 0.516 0.171
(3.248) (0.460) (1.822) (1.861) (0.051) (0.117) (0.258) (0.663) (0.266) (0.103) (1.725) (0.543) (0.508) (0.501) (0.078)
- Capital ratio 0.057 0.056 0.058 0.050 0.052 0.060 0.061 0.058 0.067 0.052 0.056 0.056 0.046 0.058 0.048
(0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011)
Panel B: County elections
No. of elections 72 5 4 6 5 6 7 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Vote share CDU 39.83 36.88 42.46 33.57 22.52 29.99 36.44 35.38 42.10 29.19 42.90 40.72 41.73 41.04 36.87
(8.44) (7.04) (6.04) (8.28) (6.26) (5.24) (8.09) (7.11) (9.61) (7.86) (8.72) (7.71) (7.39) (6.56) (7.83)
Vote share SPD 29.63 21.07 23.40 29.03 27.94 39.35 38.03 38.58 38.08 23.17 34.22 34.35 34.83 41.94 21.36
(10.32) (5.09) (8.28) (5.18) (7.03) (6.09) (5.93) (7.87) (8.16) (5.14) (8.77) (8.17) (5.25) (8.16) (6.22)
Vote share swing 9.58 8.22 9.00 12.56 16.57 12.88 14.39 10.24 6.31 13.18 9.58 12.18 9.05 13.56 13.18
(2.79) (2.29) (2.41) (0.00) (2.24) (0.26) (0.00) (1.67) (2.24) (2.38) (1.07) (1.84) (1.50) (1.93) (2.38)
Party change 0.127 0.059 0.066 0.200 0.521 0.127 0.417 0.243 0.088 0.375 0.114 0.172 0.295 0.290 0.125
(0.177) (0.114) (0.159) (0.000) (0.243) (0.113) (0.000) (0.154) (0.109) (0.381) (0.137) (0.172) (0.165) (0.201) (0.276)
Panel C: County districts
No. of districts 373 44 96 1 18 2 1 26 46 8 52 36 5 15 23
Population 75.248 10.745 12.510 3.443 2.493 0.662 1.774 6.062 7.911 1.651 17.873 4.013 1.023 2.838 2.250
Real GDP 6.648 8.381 5.954 84.448 2.619 11.049 78.662 7.852 6.060 2.682 11.049 3.28 5.651 5.185 2.058
(8.447) (5.251) (11.971) (3.773) (0.721) (8.798) (2.799) (8.224) (8.041) (1.366) (7.891) (2.093) (3.674) (2.124) (1.043)
Unempl. rate 8.32 6.11 6.81 15.49 18.88 16.52 10.91 8.35 10.48 18.01 10.14 8.43 10.63 10.31 16.55
(3.39) (1.83) (2.56) (3.80) (4.38) (3.53) (1.54) (2.73) (2.82) (3.21) (2.79) (2.71) (3.01) (2.94) (3.72)
Notes: States are abbreviated as follows: BW=Baden-Württemberg, BV=Bavaria, BE=Berlin, BR=Brandenburg,
BR=Bremen, HA=Hamburg, HS=Hesse, LS=Lower Saxony, MW=Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, NW=North
Rhine-Westphalia, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, SL=Saarland, SH=Schleswig-Holstein TH=Thuringia. Reported are to-
tal numbers (for the state level) and means (for the district level) respectively. For the latter, standard deviations are
in brackets. Election data refers to county elections of legislative bodies. CDU is the conservative party (for Bavaria,
depicted results are for CDU’s sister party: CSU) and SPD the social-democratic party of Germany. “Vote share swing”
denotes the average swing in vote shares (cumulated over all parties) that results from a given election. “Party
change” indicates the share of elections that result in a change of the winning party. State population is measured in
million habitants (as of 2010). All monetary values are measured in 1995 EUR billion.
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Figure 1. Time trends in bank lending
Savings bank lending across states
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Notes: Depicted are time series from a balanced panel of average savings bank lending for
Baden-Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BV), Brandenburg (BB), Hesse (HS), Lower Saxony (LS),
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (MW), North Rhine-Westphalia (NW), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP),
Saarland (SL), Schleswig-Holstein (SH), and Thuringia (TH). City states (Berlin, Bremen, and Ham-
burg) are omitted for better readability. Loans are measured in 1995 EUR billion.
rather static political environment. As an illustration, consider that only about
6% of all county elections in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg result in a change
of the winning party, whereas other states on average experience such changes
in power after 16% of all elections.
Note that these summary statistics are for pooled data and represent an av-
erage over time. To better assess the dynamics of German bank lending, figure 1
plots the time series of average savings bank lending, stratified by state.15 Clearly,
the loan data is subject to an upward trend, which makes it necessary to control
for time effects. Overall, savings banks across states appear to be on similar time
trends, assuring the validity of the difference-in-difference identification strategy
(see Angrist and Pischke, 2009). If anything, the time trends of Hesse, Lower Sax-
ony, and Schleswig-Holstein appear a bit idiosyncratic, which is why results that
seem exclusively driven by either of these three states would have to be taken
with a grain of salt. On this account, section 7.3 gauges the robustness of results
15For better readability, trends for the three city-states, Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg (account-
ing for a total of six savings banks) are omitted.
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Figure 2. Time trends in bank lending
Savings bank versus cooperative bank lending
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Notes: Depicted are time series from a balanced panel of savings bank (SB) and cooperative bank
(CB) lending, averaged over all 14 states in the sample. Loans are measured in 1995 EUR billion.
when these states are dropped from the sample. Finally, figure 2 shows that time
trends are also comparable for both bank types (averaged over all states in the
sample), which provides further evidence that cooperative banks are indeed a
valid control group for savings banks.
5 Methodology
Our strategy to identify clean causal effect of elections on savings bank lending,
relies on the fact that we should only observe politically motivated lending before
election years, only in counties in which elections are held at this point in time,
and – importantly – only for politically connected savings banks. Identification is
facilitated by a high degree of variation in electoral timing and the existence of
a control group of cooperative banks that operate in the same electoral districts
as savings banks. Furthermore, given the statutory nature of legislative elections
at the county level, for which early elections are de-facto non-existent, we need
not worry about any endogeneity in the timing of the key regressor. Econometri-
cally, we conduct difference-in-difference (DD) as well as triple-difference (DDD)
estimation embedded in a fixed-effects panel setup.
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Testing prediction 1: Election effect
To test prediction 1 that savings bank lending increases in the run-up to elections,
we use the following empirical specification:
Yi bst = X
′
ibstβ1+ S
′
sγ1+ T
′
tλ1+µ1Bb + θ1ELEC
C
st +δ1ELEC
C
st ∗ Bb + εi bst . (1)
where Yi bst is a measure for loans from bank i of bank type b (savings vs. co-
operative bank), operating in state s at time t. The parameter of interest, δ1,
estimates the causal effect of county election seasons – which are indicated by
the pre-election dummy variable ELECCst – on savings bank lending. To ensure
identification of δ1, we control for the following fixed effects and covariates: Ss
denotes a full vector of state effects to control for secular lending differences
across states. Similarly, time effects, Tt, are included to capture any national
trends or year shocks. In addition, bank-type effects, Bb, are needed to control
for perpetual differences between savings and cooperative banks. Bb is defined
as a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the individual unit is a
savings bank. We interact the pre-election dummy with the bank-type indicator
such that ELECCst ∗ Bb switches on if and only if Yi bst measures lending activity of
a savings bank during an election season. Finally, Xibst is a vector of bank- and
district-specific variables that may directly influence the outcome variable. The
inclusion of these covariates should considerably improve the predictability of
Yi bst , which will in turn reduce the sample variance of the estimates.
Estimation of model 1 by OLS ensures that both cross-sectional and time-
series variation are exploited. The former compares the same banks across time,
as each bank will be subject to recurring election “treatments”. The latter con-
trasts different banks at a given time, as county elections dates vary across
states. Furthermore, the control group of cooperative banks permits an encom-
passing representation of counterfactual lending in the absence of elections be-
cause politicians have no institutional sway over credit policies of these financial
institutions. Consequently, the DD estimate for δ1 captures the difference be-
tween election-induced increases in savings bank lending (which is expected to
be positive after controlling for time trends) and election-induced increases in
cooperative-bank lending (which is expected to be zero after controlling for time
trends).
To further illustrate the identification strategy, consider the following exam-
ple:
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Figure 3. Map of the cities of Ulm and Neu-Ulm
Location of savings banks and cooperative banks
Ulm
State of Baden-Würtemberg
Neu-Ulm
State of Bavaria
Notes: Depicted is a map of the German cities of Ulm and Neu-Ulm. The red and blue-orange
emblems denote the location of savings banks and cooperative banks in these municipalities, re-
spectively. Source: Google maps.
Figure 3 depicts a map of the cities of Ulm (situated in the state of Baden-
Württem-berg) and Neu-Ulm (located in the state of Bavaria), which – histori-
cally as well as geographically – can be interpreted as one municipality that is
arbitrarily divided by the Danube river (highlighted in blue). In our sample, we
observe the savings bank Sparkasse Ulm (marked by the red savings bank em-
blem north-west of the river) over time, which enables us to compare its lend-
ing behavior in election years to that in off-election years. Additionally, we can
contrast its credit policy with that of Sparkasse Neu-Ulm-Illertissen, a Bavarian
savings bank that is literally a stone’s throw away (depicted by the red emblem
south-east of the river): Since intervals between county elections are different
for the two states in question, we are able to exploit information from years dur-
ing which both cities, neither of the cities, and either one of the two cities face
an election. On top of that, we can contrast savings bank loans for any given year
with those of politically unconnected cooperative banks Volksbank Ulm-Biberach
and Volksbank Neu-Ulm, marked by blue-orange cooperative-bank emblems. Ex-
tending this analysis to the 379 counties in our sample, arguably provides us
with a sound characterization of what counterfactual lending in the absence of
elections would look like.
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Testing prediction 2: Election type
More evidence for the main hypothesis would be provided if prediction 2 – that
only county elections, and not state elections have a systematic impact on savings
bank lending – were to be confirmed by the data as well.
Empirical testing of prediction 2 is straightforward, as model 1 can be applied
almost verbatim since both, legislative county elections and state elections, vary
at the state level. The only difference to the specification used for prediction 1 is
that ELECCst is replaced with an indicator for state election seasons, ELEC
S
st :
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Yi bst = X
′
ibstβ2+ S
′
sγ2+ T
′
tλ2+µ2Bb + θ2ELEC
S
st +δ2ELEC
S
st ∗ Bb + εi bst . (2)
Testing prediction 3: Lending cycle
Another way of solidifying support for the main hypothesis is to look at post-
election periods, as the increase in lending should be confined to the immediate
election season. Particularly, we expect lending policies to quickly return to their
steady-state level once ballots are cast. Prediction 3 can be tested with the fol-
lowing specification to be estimated with OLS:
Yi bst = X
′
ibstβ3+ S
′
sγ3+ T
′
tλ3+µ3Bb + θ3ELEC
C
st−τ+δ3ELECCst−τ ∗ Bb + εi bst , (3)
To study post-election periods, we separately estimate equation 3 with τ =
(1,2,3,4), such that the dummy variable ELECCst−τ indicates whether there was
an election in state s, τ years ago. We expect the estimate of δ3 to be either zero
or, in case of binding credit constraints, negative. To gauge how far in advance
lending increases will have to take effect to leave a footprint in the minds of
voters, we also examine the year preceding the election year by setting τ=−1.
With an average interval between elections of 5 years, the last-mentioned effect
should be comparable to that of τ = +4, as it blurs the line between post-election
periods of the past and pre-election periods of the next campaign.
16Note that we refrain from replicating this analysis with federal elections, as their effect would
not be identified when year dummies are used to control for time effects: Federal election dates
only vary in the time dimension (with the usual interval being 4 years), rendering them indistin-
guishable from year shocks.
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Testing prediction 4: Electoral competition
The test for prediction 4 can be implemented with the following DDD model,
estimated with OLS:
Yi bst = X
′
ibstβ4+ S
′
sγ4+ T
′
tλ4+µ4Bb +ψ4 Ii t + θ4ELEC
C
st + . . . (4)
+φ14Bb ∗ Ii t +φ24Bb ∗ ELECCst +φ34 Ii t ∗ ELECCst + . . .
+δ4ELEC
C
st ∗ Bb ∗ Ii t + εi bst ,
where Ii t is the respective indicator variable of interest: In case current elec-
toral competition is investigated, Ii t = Ci t is an indicator for whether the upcom-
ing election is contested. The ruling party’s past entrenchment (or alternatively:
the lack of local electoral competition in general) is measured with Ii t = Ei t . In
line with the predictions in section 3, the former indicator switches on if the cur-
rent election is competed, while the latter takes the value of one in case the local
political process is generally not contested. To ensure robustness, we present
several alternative measures for electoral contestedness and party entrenchment
(see section 6). The first line of model 4 contains the usual controls as well as all
main fixed effects. Line 2 contains the full set of first-order interactions which are
necessary to identify the causal effect of interest, captured by the DDD estimate
of δ4 in line 3 (see Gruber, 1994).
Main empirical specification
All results presented in section 6 are estimates from an unbalanced panel to
which we apply the following empirical specification: The dependent variable,
Yi bst , is defined as the natural logarithm of loans of bank i as reported in the
balance sheet for year t, normalized by total assets to account for the size of the
respective bank. Note that log-transformation does not drive our results but fa-
cilitates interpretation of coefficients – which represent (semi-)elasticities – and
accounts for the right-skewedness of our data. The pre-election indicator, ELECCst ,
is defined as follows: It takes on the value of 1 if there is an election in either
the final two quarters of the same year, or the first two quarters of the follow-
ing year.17 The vector of control variables, Xibst, includes bank-specific (total
assets and capital ratio) and district-specific (population size, real GDP, as well
17This definition ensures that election-induced lending is reflected in the balance sheet of the
actually relevant year: If an election takes place in, say, January, pre-election lending will arguably
leave its mark in the balance sheet of the previous year, which is why the latter will switch on
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as population and GDP growth rates) time-varying covariates. To account for the
possibility that the bank variables are only sequentially exogenous, we use their
lagged values instead (see Dinç, 2005). All elements of Xibst are log-transformed.
Finally, standard errors are clustered at the bank level (as opposed to the bank-
year level) to correct for substantial serial correlation. Note that the results are
not driven by these modeling choices. As section 7 demonstrates, the main con-
clusions are insensitive to estimator choices, assumptions regarding the error-
term structure, varying definitions of key variables, sets of controls, and sample
compositions. Notably, results remain intact if the set of covariates is replaced
with bank fixed effects and if standard errors are clustered at the district or the
state level.
6 Results
In a nutshell, all of the testable predictions withstand empirical scrutiny, which
strongly corroborates the hypothesis that there is a politically induced lending
cycle. Not only do estimated effects have the correct sign, they are also statis-
tically significant at least at the 5% level, and in many cases even at the 0.1%
level.
Prediction 1: Do savings banks expand lending prior to county elections?
The empirical test of prediction 1 is summarized in column (A) of table 2, which
contains OLS estimates of the key parameters from model 1 as well as regres-
sion coefficients of control variables. These results suggest that in the run-up to
county elections the average savings bank experiences a 2.1% increase in the
stock of lending. This estimate is statistically highly significant at the 0.1% level.
To provide a better sense for the magnitude of the effect, consider that its abso-
lute size amounts to an average of EUR 56.9 million extra stock in lending per
bank. Note that this increase is relative to the total stock in bank lending. If we
were able to observe the extension of new credit contracts, relative effect sizes
would be substantially larger. Providing a back-of-the-envelope calculation and
ELECCst , whereas ELEC
C
st = 0 for the actual election year. By contrast, if the election is held around
year’s end, the balance sheet of the preceding year is probably less informative than that of the
election year, for which reason the pre-election indicator would then coincide with the year of the
election.
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Table 2. Results for predictions 1 and 2
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total
assets
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Key regressors
- ELECCst ∗ Bb 0.021*** – – 0.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
- ELECCst -0.005 -0.001 – -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
- ELECSst ∗ Bb – – 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
- ELECSst – – -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Bank controls
- Total assets -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
- Capital ratio 0.112* 0.176** 0.112* 0.112*
(0.044) (0.066) (0.044) (0.044)
District controls
- Population 0.002 0.016 0.002 0.002
(0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015)
- Popul. growth 1.710* 2.035 1.724* 1.708*
(0.732) (1.185) (0.732) (0.732)
- Real GDP 0.015 -0.001 0.015 0.015
(0.013) (0.184) (0.013) (0.013)
- GDP growth 0.075 0.082 0.073 0.074
(0.047) (0.067) (0.047) (0.047)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes No Yes Yes
Banks in sample All Coop All All
Election County County State Both
N 11,511 6,300 11,511 11,511
R2 0.235 0.149 0.234 0.235
Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see sec-
tion 5). Key regressors are ELECCst ∗ Bb, ELECCst, and ELECSst ∗ Bb,
respectively. The indexes C and S denote county and state elec-
tions, respectively. Coop stands for cooperative banks. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank level and are stated in brackets.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%,
and the 0.1% level, respectively.
assuming an average loan tenure of 3-4 years, this estimate would translate into
a 6-8% effect on newly extended credit.
Besides this causal effect of interest, the bank’s capital ratio and population
growth in the electoral district are additional covariates with a statistically sig-
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nificant impact on lending. All other variables, albeit not exerting significant
influence, enter the model with intuitive signs.
As the second entry in column (A) indicates, the lending behavior of coop-
erative banks appears to be unaffected by municipal elections – a result that is
corroborated in column (B), which contains results from estimating the effect of
elections in a sample that only contains cooperative banks. This finding confirms
that the hike in pre-election lending is unlikely to be demand-side driven, since
one would expect any macro-economic factors to influence the entire banking
sector and not only politically controlled savings banks.
Prediction 2: Does lending react to state elections?
Now we turn to the second prediction that credit policy should react only to
county elections. A look at column (C) of table 2 suggests that this seems to in-
deed be the case. Depicted is the estimate for the causal effect of state elections
on savings bank lending. In line with our premise, there is no evidence that lend-
ing reacts in any systematic way to elections at higher government levels. This
result is confirmed when jointly regressing on both election types (see column
(D)). As was the case with the non-effect for cooperative banks, these findings
lend additional support to the assertion that we are not simply measuring the
consequences of spurred credit demand in response to political business cycle
policies, since these should arguably be in place before state election as well.
Prediction 3: What happens to lending before and after election seasons?
Prediction 3 suggests that the increase in lending should be limited to pre-election
periods and quickly disappear, or even become negative, once the election was
held. We test this hypothesis by estimating the effect of county elections on sav-
ings bank lending in the year preceding and the four years following that elec-
tion. Results are displayed in table 3, with each column representing a separate
regression for which τ is accordingly varied in model 3. The effect for the year
preceding the election year is depicted in column (A), column (B) has results for
the election year (corresponding to those in column (A) of table 2), and post-
election years are tackled in columns (C) to (F). Recall that, since the average
interval between elections amounts to 5 years, results for τ = +4 should be
roughly in line with those for τ = −1, as they mark both, the ending of an old
and the beginning of a new electoral cycle.
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Table 3. Results for prediction 3
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total assets
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Key regressors
- ELECCst−τ ∗ Bb 0.011* 0.021*** 0.001 -0.009 -0.009* 0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
- ELECCst−τ -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 0.004 0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year relative to election τ=−1 τ= 0 τ=+1 τ=+2 τ=+3 τ=+4
N 11,511 11,511 11,511 11,511 11,511 11,511
R2 0.245 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.235
Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see section 5). The key regressor
is ELECCst−τ ∗Bb for varying τ. τ= 0 indicates an election year, τ < 0 indicates pre-election
years, and τ > 0 indicates post-election years. The index C denotes county elections.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are stated in brackets. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
As is evident from table 2, a slight but statistically significant (at the 5%
level) increase is already measurable in the year preceding the actual election,
indicating an early start of politically induced excess lending. As expected, the
effect dissipates directly after the election year, returning to its steady state level.
Three years after the election, the election effect dips into significantly negative
territory (at the 5% level). We take this as evidence for (overly) prudent lending
policies after elections, consistent with a binding credit constraint that banks face
to make up for the excessive pre-election lending. In the fourth year following
an election, lending spikes upwards once again to initiate a new cycle. Note that
no such cycle is present for cooperative banks, as no estimate in the second row
of table 2 is significantly different from zero, suggesting a flat temporal pattern
for these banks.
To provide a visual representation of the electoral lending cycle for savings
banks, we plot the effects, county elections have on lending in the five years
surrounding said election, into figure 4. The solid line depicts the same point
estimates as those in the first row of table 2. The dotted lines indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
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Figure 4. Results for prediction 3
The lending cycle for municipal elections
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Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see section 5). The solid line depicts DD
estimates of δ3 coming from model 3. Dottet lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Time is
measured on the abscissa.
Note that the resulting picture provides, once more, evidence for the political
nature of the increase in loan extensions and refutes a more subtle alternative
demand-side explanation that customers might correctly anticipate that it will
be easier to be granted pre-election loans and therefore pull forward their credit
applications from the post- to the election season. If the latter argument had
any merit, there should be a marked dip in credit extension in the immediate
post-election year, which is, however, not the case.
Prediction 4: What is the role of electoral competition?
Prediction 4 suggests that electoral competition has two separate effects. For one,
the increase in lending may depend on the ability to manipulate the bank’s poli-
cies and hence will be more pronounced, the stronger the general (or historical)
entrenchment – represented by Ei t – of the incumbent party. This hypothesis is
under consideration in column (A) of table 4. To measure the degree of entrench-
ment, we define an indicator variable E1, that switches on if the electoral district,
the bank operates in, experiences relatively few changes in party power.18 As col-
18To construct this measure, we create a normalized index that counts the number of times the
strongest party has changed within a district. E1 indicates whether the electoral district under
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Table 4. Results for prediction 4
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total assets
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C)
DDD Interaction
- ELECCst ∗ Bb ∗ Eit 0.019 – 0.028**
(0.012) (0.011)
- ELECCst ∗ Bb ∗ Ci t – 0.017 0.028*
(0.011) (0.012)
DD Main effect
- ELECCst ∗ Bb 0.006 0.010 -0.011
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes
First-order interactions Yes Yes Yes
Measure for Ei t E1 – E1
Measure for Ci t – C1 C1
N 12,679 12,660 12,660
R2 0.227 0.227 0.227
Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see sec-
tion 5). Ei t indicates whether political entrenchment is generally
high in the district, bank i operates in. Ci t measures the contested-
ness of the current election. E1=Indicator for low incumbent party
turnover; C1=Indicator for winner’s vote share<40% or margin
of victory<7%. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level
and are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signif-
icance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
umn (A) of table 4 shows, there is some evidence that stability of incumbency
may in fact be a precondition for electoral cycles in lending: Only savings banks
in politically stable areas increase lending by 1.9% in the run-up to elections,
even though the estimate is only significant at the 10% level. This election effect
is not present in areas that see more frequent changes in power, as indicated by
the DD main effect being insignificantly different from zero.
consideration ranks in the bottom quartile of the distribution of said index. Note that a change
in relative party strength may not necessarily translate into a change in power, as the party with
the plurality of votes may fail to reach an outright majority, in which case it may have to accept
opposition status if the other parties agree to form a coalition government. This notwithstanding,
E1 should provide a reasonable approximation to the general stability of incumbency, we are
ultimately interested in.
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Table 5. Results for prediction 4
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total assets
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
DDD Interaction
- ELECCst ∗ Bb ∗ Eit 0.027* 0.024* 0.018 0.031** 0.028* 0.026*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
- ELECCst ∗ Bb ∗ Ci t 0.025* 0.022 0.025 0.028* 0.025* 0.024
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
DD Main effect
- ELECCst ∗ Bb -0.009 -0.006 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-order interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Measure for Ei t E1 E1 E1 E2 E2 E2
Measure for Ci t C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3
N 12,660 12,660 12,660 12,660 12,660 12,660
R2 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.229 0.229
Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see section 5). Ei t indicates
whether political entrenchment is generally high in the district, bank i operates in.
Ci t measures the contestedness of the current election. E1=Indicator for low in-
cumbent party turnover; E2=Indicator for low contestedness of preceding election;
C1=Indicator for winner’s vote share<40% or margin of victory<7%; C2=Indicator
for winner’s vote share<37% or margin of victory<5%; C3=Indicator for high index
of contestedness; C4=Indicator for high index of change in winning margin. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank level and are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
The converse effect of current electoral competition, which may increase in-
centives to induce a lending cycle, is under study in the second column of table 4.
Since pre-election polling is generally unavailable for county elections, we have
to rely on an ex-post measure when assessing the contestedness – denoted by
Ci t – of the electoral campaign: the actual election outcome. Though there is
an obvious endogeneity issue, we are confident that, given rational expectations
and a reasonable feeling of local politicians for the mood of their electorate, the
closeness of the final result should provide a reasonable proxy for the perceived
closeness of the contest itself. Moreover, below we document that the results are
robust to alternative measures of current contestedness. The measure used in
the main empirical specification takes on the value of 1 if the winner’s final vote
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share is either below 40% or if the margin of victory is less than 5%. According
to estimates in column (B), there is some evidence of current electoral compe-
tition exerting systematic influence on the strength of the election effect, which
is estimated to be 1.7% even though statistical significance is only at the 15%
level.
Yet, given that our measure of present contestedness may in part capture
the diametric effect of general entrenchment as well, we refine the empirical
specification by jointly controlling for both dimensions of electoral competition.
Results are displayed in column (C) of table 4. They provide clear evidence that
– given overall entrenchment in the district – lending cycles are more likely if
the upcoming election promises to be close. According to the point estimates,
savings banks in districts that fall into this category, increase their lending by
2.8% relative to a situation with little competition. Notably, the earlier result that
entrenchment can be viewed as a precondition for politically induced lending,
is soundly reconfirmed, as statistically significant election effects appear to be
exclusively present in districts with high degrees of incumbent entrenchment.
This pattern is corroborated when alternative measures for electoral com-
petition are used. Table 5 contains results for several combinations of various
contestedness (C) and entrenchment (E) measures: C1 and E1 are defined as
above. C2 is a dummy variable that indicates elections where the winning party
accrued less than 37% of the vote or held a lower than 5% advantage over the
runner-up.19 C3 is a bottom-quartile indicator for a normalized index that mea-
sures both, the absolute vote share of the winning party, as well as its margin of
victory. C4 indicates an election in the bottom quartile of a normalized index that
ranks all observations in our sample by the change in victory margins between
elections, i.e., C4 captures whether there are dramatic changes between elec-
tions. E2, which measures the closeness of the preceding election to gauge the
degree of incumbency power during the current term, is defined as the lagged
value of C3.
To visualize the role of electoral competition, we stratify our sample by po-
litical entrenchment and contestedness and concentrate on two polar cases. Par-
ticularly, we first apply model 3 to a subsample that consists of districts that
19Note that for the definition of close elections we have experimented with different cut-off
values between the interval of 35% to 45% (for the vote share) and 4% to 8% (for the margin of
victory), which all yielded similar results.
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Figure 5. Results for prediction 4
The lending cycle for municipal elections (High entrenchment and high competition)
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Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see section 5). The solid line depicts DD
estimates of δ3 coming from model 3. Dottet lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Time is
measured on the abscissa. Entrenchment is measured by E1 and contestedness is measured by C3.
Figure 6. Results for prediction 4
The lending cycle for municipal elections (Low entrenchment and low competition)
-0,08 
-0,06 
-0,04 
-0,02 
0 
0,02 
0,04 
0,06 
0,08 
0,1 
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
D
D
 e
st
u
m
at
es
 a
n
d 
95
%
 c
on
fi
de
n
ce
 in
te
rv
al
s 
Time (measured in years before and after election) 
Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see section 5). The solid line depicts DD
estimates of δ3 coming from model 3. Dottet lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Time is
measured on the abscissa. Entrenchment is measured by E1 and contestedness is measured by C3.
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are generally characterized by high levels of entrenchment but that face a closer
than usual current election. We then fit the same model with data from counties
with low levels of entrenchment but low levels of current competition.20
The lending cycle for the strata of highly entrenched but currently highly
contested areas is depicted in figure 5. As is evident from the graph, the pattern
reaffirms all conclusions drawn from the entire sample. However, effect sizes are
roughly magnified by a factor of 2 to 3, indicating that politically induced lending
is much more common when politicians have both the ability and the incentive
to influence savings bank decisions. In contrast to this, evidence from figure 6,
which depicts the lending dynamics of savings banks in counties with low levels
of entrenchment but low levels of current competition, suggests that bank ac-
tivities appear unaffected by the timing of elections. In fact, estimated election
effects closely oscillate around zero throughout both pre- and post-election peri-
ods. The same holds true for the election season itself, suggesting that the “right”
kind of political climate is able to keep local politicians in check.
7 Robustness
As mentioned above, results presented in section 6 are based on the main em-
pirical specification being applied to an unbalanced sample that makes use of
the maximum information available. To ensure that conclusions are not driven
by these choices, we perform a number of robustness checks that demonstrate
the immunity of the electoral effect on savings bank lending to varying estima-
tor choices, assumptions regarding the error-term structure, definitions of key
variables, sets of controls, and sample compositions.
7.1 Alternative estimators and modes of statistical inference
The first robustness analysis we present assesses the stability of results to varying
modes of statistical inference. The growing literature on cluster-robust inference
(see Bertrand et al., 2004; Angrist and Pischke, 2009; and Cameron and Miller,
2010 for an overview) highlights the importance of accounting for potential se-
rial correlation and regional clustering in panel data. Both phenomena implicate
20To achieve this, we use the same quartile indicators as before. The resulting strata are of
comparable size, containing roughly 2,000 bank-year observation each.
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Table 6. Alternative modes of statistical inference
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total assets
Explanatory Regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Key regressors
- ELECCst ∗ Bb 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.014* 0.015** 0.021*** 0.021*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
- ELECCst -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes – Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes n.a. n.a. Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes n.a. n.a. Yes Yes
Estimator OLS RE FE FE OLS OLS
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank District State
N 11,511 11,511 11,511 11,511 11,511 11,511
R2 0.235 0.219 0.010 0.010 0.235 0.235
Notes: Abbreviations are as follows: OLS=Ordinary Least Square; RE=Random
Effects; FE=Fixed Effects (Within estimator). “Cluster” indicates whether stan-
dard errors are clustered on the bank, district, or state level. “n.a.” denotes that
time-constant variables are omitted. Standard errors are stated in brackets. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level,
respectively.
a violation of one of the main assumptions traditionally imposed when working
with cross-sectional data: the independence of observations. While OLS will still
be consistent, precision is likely overestimated if these issues are ignored.
Serial correlation
Serially correlated errors, εist , are a typical problem of panel data applications.
Formally, Cor(εist ,εisu) = ρε 6= 0, for t 6= u, where ρε denotes the intraclass corre-
lation of the error. That is, the individual (here: bank i) is thought of as a cluster
whose observations over time are not independent of one another. A rough es-
timate of ρε – the average autocorrelation over 5 lags of OLS residuals coming
from model 1 – equals 0.412 and suggests that our data is indeed subject to sub-
stantial serial correlation. For this reason, and in line with Bertrand et al. (2004),
Khwaja and Mian (2005), and Cameron and Trivedi (2010), the main empirical
specification already corrects for serial correlation by clustering standard errors
at the bank level instead of the bank-year level.
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An alternative way of dealing with autocorrelated errors consists of estimat-
ing model 1 with a random-effects (RE) specification (see Cameron and Trivedi,
2010). The individual-effects model provides the following rationale for serial
correlation: If the error εist = αi + rist , then the presence of a bank-specific ef-
fect, αi, induces correlation over time, even if the idiosyncratic component, rist ,
is iid. If these assumption on the error structure are correct and as long as αi
is truly random, RE is more efficient than OLS, which is why we present results
for regression 1, fitted by FGLS in column (B) of table 6. When compared to
the baseline specification in column (A), the estimated election effect is only
slightly changed by this alternative approach of correcting for serial correlation.
The estimated standard deviation of the individual effect, σˆα, equals 0.114 and
is roughly as large as that of the idiosyncratic error, σˆr = 0.110. Furthermore, in-
traclass correlation is estimated to equal 0.427, which is in line with the ad-hoc
estimate, mentioned above.
Of course, the RE estimator is only consistent if αi is uncorrelated with re-
gressors. If we wish to relax this assumption, the individual effect needs to be
eliminated with a fixed-effects (FE) specification that only relies on variation
over time. Even though we are not particularly worried about correlated effects,
results for model 1 when fitted by a within estimator are presented in column
(C) of table 6. While the election effect appears to be somewhat smaller than
before (amounting to 1.4%), it is still precisely estimated. We take this as en-
couraging evidence that the results survive, even when identification is based
on within-variation alone. Similar results are achieved when replacing all bank-
specific covariates with a simple bank fixed effect (column (D)).
Regional clustering
If data has a group structure, independence may not only be violated for observa-
tions of one individual bank over time, but also across banks that are part of the
same regional cluster. In this case, εist will contain some variation that is likely
to be common to banks in the same geographical area and year, for instance, a
regional business cycle. An obvious solution to this problem is to correct stan-
dard errors for clustering at the geographical level, these region-year shocks are
most likely to occur.
In the present context, there are two candidates for such regional clusters:
the municipal district (which typically contains one savings bank and one to
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four cooperative banks) and the state. While clustering standard errors at the
district level is straightforward, this methodological fix usually poses problems
for the state level, since robust inference requires a large-enough number of
clusters in order to avoid erroneously large standard errors. Even though the
literature suggests a minimum number of around 40 to 50 groups to be on the
safe side, (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009 and Cameron and Miller, 2010), the
effect even remains statistically significant with just 14 states. On this account,
results in columns (E) and (F) of table 6 suggest that in the present context
regional clustering is not much reason for concern.
7.2 Alternative choices of variables
Alternative dependent variables
We continue by gauging the robustness of that election effect to the choice of the
dependent variable. Again, results for the benchmark specification are repeated
in column (A) of table 7. Column (B) shows that results are not driven by the
decision to normalize log loans by the bank’s total assets, as the estimates for the
variables of interest do not change if log loans are used instead. In fact, the only
change worth mentioning is that the coefficient for total assets (not reported in
the table) sharply increases to a very precisely estimated 0.992, leaving barely
any variation in the data unexplained, as is evidenced by R2 exceeding 0.978.
Note that this is not an indication for overfitting. Much rather, this tight connec-
tion is not surprising since German financial regulation mandates that a bank’s
lending position be backed by equivalent net equity. This quasi-mechanical rela-
tionship between these variables is yet another reason we opted for normalized
dependent variables in the main specification.
In a second deviation from the main empirical model, we re-estimate equa-
tion 1 without log-transforming the data. Results in column (C) and (D) show
that, while estimated effect sizes appear to slightly decrease, the main conclu-
sions remain nevertheless intact. Note that column (D) provides the aforemen-
tioned average size of the election effect in absolute terms, which is estimated to
amount to roughly EUR 56.9 million per bank.
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Table 7. Alternative dependent variables
Dependent variables: See table notes
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Key regressors
- ELECCst ∗ Bb 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.016** 56.862
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (32.496)
- ELECCst -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -1.042
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (7.125)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-transformed Yes Yes – –
Normalized by total assets Yes – Yes –
N 11,511 11,511 11,511 11,511
R2 0.235 0.978 0.164 0.959
Notes: Dependent variables are for column (A): normalized log loans;
for column (B): log loans; for column (C): normalized real loans; and
for column (D): real loans in EUR 1,000. Standard errors are clustered
at the bank level and are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate sta-
tistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
Alternative control variables
The following two tables provide evidence that the election effect is also robust
to variations in the set of covariates used for analysis. Table 8 displays results
for specifications that drop certain variables from the list of regressors, whereas
specifications in table 9 are augmented with additional control variables, not
used in the main empirical model. Again, to ease comparison, results for the
benchmark specification are repeated in column (A) of these tables.
As is evident from columns (B) through (F) of table 8, the election effect re-
mains significant at the 5% level if any of the control variables is excluded from
the set of regressors. Results are somewhat weakened if we fail to control for dis-
trict controls (column (F)), as the size of the election effect is roughly cut in half.
Given that the analysis certainly benefits from controlling for variables that may
impact lending decisions irrespective of electoral timing, we attach higher cred-
ibility to specifications that account for both bank-specific factors and district-
level macroeconomic factors. We are nonetheless pleased that the election effect
is found in all specifications and not the artificial result of bad control. Notably,
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Table 8. Alternative control variables: Fewer covariates
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total assets
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Key regressors
- ELECCst ∗ Bb 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.012* 0.010* 0.022*** 0.011*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
- ELECCst -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Bank controls Yes – Yes – Yes –
District controls Yes Yes – – Yes –
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,511 11,511 15,666 15,666 11,511 15,666
R2 0.235 0.219 0.225 0.212 0.114 0.046
Notes: Time-varying explanatory variables are excluded from the vector of con-
trols as indicated by “–”. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are
stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the
1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
the results even survive when excluding state and time fixed effects, which un-
derscores the generality of the effect, elections have on lending.
To examine whether the further addition of covariates has a dampening effect
on the δ1 estimates, we include a multitude of district-level control variables to
the set of regressors. As results in table 9 demonstrate, neither information on lo-
cal public debt, (un)employment, real earnings, nor firm creation have a notable
impact on the election effect, with the latter remaining in a narrow interval of
1.9% to 2.2%. Furthermore, none of the additional control variables have a sta-
tistically significant effect on lending themselves. Since some of these variables
are unavailable for the time before 1998, we exclude them from the main specifi-
cation to avoid needless reductions in sample size and the preclusion of analysis
for most of the 1990s. Summing up, the documented election effect seems also
not to be the the result of omitted-variable bias.
Alternative definitions of the pre-election indicator
The definition of the pre-election indicator employed for the main empirical spec-
ification is chosen to make sure that, conditional on the coarse annual bank data
we have access to, the true pre-election year is correctly identified. To clarify this
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Table 9. Alternative control variables 2: Additional covariates
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total assets
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Key regressors
- ELECCst ∗ Bb 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.019** 0.019**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
- ELECCst -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Bank controls
- Total assets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Capital ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls
- Population Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Population growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Real GDP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Real GDP growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Public debt – Yes – – – – Yes
- Employment – – Yes – – – Yes
- Unemployment – – – Yes – – Yes
- Real earnings – – – – Yes – Yes
- Firm creation – – – – – Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,511 11,355 11,480 11,511 11,511 9,660 9,538
R2 0.235 0.236 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.219 0.223
Notes: Combinations of time-varying explanatory variables are added to the vector of controls as
indicated by “Yes”. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are stated in brackets. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
point, if an election takes place in, say, January, pre-election lending will have
been extended in the previous year. Hence, the pre-election indicator from the
main empirical model indicates an election in either the last two quarters of the
current year or the first two quarters of the following year.
Table 10 presents in column (A) results from the benchmark specification and
in columns (B) and (C) results for two alternative definitions of the pre-election
indicator: P2, presented in (B), indicates an election in the current calendar
year and P3, in (C) indicates an election in the following calendar year. Reassur-
ingly, the pre-election lending effect is still highly significant, but reduced in size,
which makes sense given that in both cases we are less effectively capturing the
period actually affected by the electoral event.
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Table 10. Alternative pre-election indicators
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total assets
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C)
Key regressors
- ELECCst ∗ Bb 0.021*** 0.013* 0.017**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
- ELECCst -0.005 -0.007 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes
Pre-election indicator P1 P2 P3
N 11,511 11,511 11,551
R2 0.235 0.235 0.235
Notes: Abbreviations are as follows: P1 is the pre-election indicator
from our main empirical specification and indicates an election in
either the last two quarters of the current year or the first two quar-
ters of the following year. P2 indicates an election in the current
calendar year. P3 indicates an election in the following calendar
year. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Empirical p-
values are stated in brackets. Boldfaced numbers indicate statistical
significance at the 5% level.
7.3 Alternative sample compositions
Alternative panel balancedness
The main results from section 6 come from the entire available data sample. As
mentioned in section 4.1, our bank data is quite unbalanced since many banks,
though having been active in the market, only start to be documented in the
database and hence enter the sample some time after 1993. At the same time,
the sample is subject to mild attrition that is due to mergers of banks within
one class (savings or cooperative banks). To ensure that results are not driven
by these data characteristics, we re-estimate model 1 on a completely balanced
panel. This alternative sample consists of 289 savings banks (4,913 bank years)
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Table 11. Alternative sample compositions
Dependent variable: Log loans normalized by total assets
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Robust standard errors in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J)
Key regressor
- ELECCst ∗ Bb 0.021*** 0.023* 0.026** 0.020** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.030** 0.016* 0.024*** –
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
- ELECCst -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 0.011**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balanced panel – Yes – – – – – – – –
Year range – – 90-99 00-09 – – – – – –
Dropped states – – – – East City Idio BV – –
Dropped banks – – – – – – – – Largest Coop
N 11,511 5,280 3,731 7,780 10,931 11,380 8,963 8,819 10,177 5,211
R2 0.235 0.114 0.341 0.202 0.088 0.237 0.270 0.270 0.259 0.378
Notes: Abbreviations are as follows: “–” indicates choices of our main specification. Years: 90=1990; 99=1999;
00=2000; 09=2009. East=East German states; City=City States (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg); Idio=States on
idiosyncratic time trends (Hesse, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein); BV=Bavaria (state with most prominent
election effect). Largest=Banks in the highest decile of loan sum sizes; Coop=Cooperative banks. Standard errors
are clustered at the bank level and are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%,
the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
and 177 cooperative banks (3,009 bank years) and represents roughly 42% of
the original sample.21
While column (A) of table 11 shows the results for the benchmark specifica-
tion, it is evident from column (B) that the election effect proves to be immune
to even such extreme reductions in sample size: Based on banks that remained
in the sample from 1993 to 2009, the estimated increase in savings bank lending
amounts to 2.3% and is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Alternative time intervals
To investigate the stability of the election effect across time, we divide the whole
sample into two panel sets of roughly equal size, with the first covering the years
21Note that in additional robustness checks not reported here, we have also experimented with
earlier and later cut-off points than 1993 to create balanced panels. Estimations based on these
yield comparable conclusions.
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between 1990 and 1999 and the second covering the time between 2000 and
2009. As can be seen in columns (C) and (D) of table 11, lending increases of at
least 2% occur in both the 1990s and the 2000s and are, hence, unlikely to be
driven by any temporal anomalies not captured by the set of covariates and time
dummies. The fact that the election effect for the later time interval is estimated
with increased precision, is most likely attributable to the higher number of bank
years: Recall that the representativeness of Hoppenstedt’s cooperative bank data
greatly improves during the early 2000s, as many smaller banks whose balance
sheets were not collected before, are added to the sample around this time. On
this account, it is encouraging that the election effect is robust to this kind of
sample selectivity as well.
Alternative regional compositions
To further assess the generality of results, we apply model 1 to four sub-samples
that individually exclude certain sets of states from the main sample: the East
German states; the three city states (Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg); the three
states that are on idiosyncratic time trends (Hesse, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-
Holstein, see section 4.4); and Bavaria which happens to be the state for which
the election effect is most pronounced. As columns (E) through (H) of table 11
show, these changes leave the main conclusions intact, suggesting that they are
not driven by regional effects. While results are almost unchanged by the ex-
clusion of city states and the former GDR territory, they become even stronger
when ignoring the states whose lending trends appear out of sync with the rest of
Germany. The fact that the effect decreases when Bavaria is excluded, is likely ex-
plained by the role of incumbent entrenchment, which – as argued in section 6 –
appears to be a precondition for the ability of politicians to manipulate bank poli-
cies. Considering that elections in Bavaria are historically much less contested
than those in other states, the observed differences may well be driven by this
feature.22
22This pattern holds for all indicators we constructed to capture the degree of political com-
petition in a district. To give one example, 8% of all municipal elections of legislative bodies in
Germany are lost by the incumbent party, whereas Bavaria (3%) is characterized by considerably
higher party dominance.
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Alternative composition of banks
In a next step, we assure that the results are not driven by outliers and remove
all banks whose loan sums exceed EUR 2 billion, effectively shedding the upper
decile of banks from the sample. These are mainly banks that operate in large
cities such as Cologne, Munich, and Frankfurt. As results in column (I) of ta-
ble 11 show, effect sizes, if anything, even slightly increase, suggesting that the
observed phenomenon is not limited to a few “power players” in the banking
sector.
In yet another deviation from the main specification, column (J) contains
results from a sample without cooperative banks. As argued in section 6, we
believe that the existence of a control group improves identification of the causal
effects. However, to provide evidence that results are not driven by cooperative-
bank-specific factors, we re-estimate the election effect when only exploiting
cross-sectional and time differences between savings banks. Overall, the main
results are confirmed, even though effect sizes appear to be somewhat smaller.
The electoral lending cycle, as estimated without a control group of politically
unconnected banks, is visualized in figure 7 and roughly follows the pattern
depicted in figure 4, with a significant spike just before an election and some
weak evidence for credit crunching in the years thereafter.
8 Conclusion
We provide causal evidence for electorally induced lending cycles in Germany –
a country that is often praised for its strong institutional environment. German
law stipulates the active involvement of county-level politicians in the manage-
ment of local savings banks. Exploiting the rich cross-sectional and intertemporal
variation in our data, we find that – consistent with our predictions – politically
motivated excess lending only occurs before county election, only in counties
in which elections are held at this point in time, and only for savings banks as
opposed to politically independent cooperative banks. These lending distortions
are economically meaningful and are most pronounced in counties where the rul-
ing party is deeply entrenched (providing the ability to affect bank decisions) but
faces a close re-election race (providing the incentive to resort to inefficient poli-
cies). The latter result adds to the findings of Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004)
who show that transparency, voter awareness, and the maturity of a democracy
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Figure 7. Results for prediction 3
The lending cycle for municipal elections (without cooperative banks)
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Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see section 5). The solid line depicts es-
timates of the effect of municipal elections on savings bank lending, when no control group of
cooperative banks is used. Dottet lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Time is measured on the
abscissa.
are important in determining the scope for opportunistic political cycles. Since
all of these factors are arguably in good order in Germany, the results highlight
that continued actual political competition – and not only potential competition
guaranteed by strong institutions – is vital in keeping political tinkering in check.
The election-induced lending effects are very robust to alternative empiri-
cal specifications (the choice of estimators, the mode of statistical inference, the
choice of controls, the definition of key variables, and the composition of the sam-
ple), which emphasizes the generality of our findings. Furthermore, the fact that
we control for macroeconomic variables (such as GDP in levels and in growth
rates) at the district level, and that we do not find effects for state elections or
among cooperative banks, renders the results unlikely to be driven by credit de-
mand, underlining the politically induced margin of distortion of the observed
pattern.
While the latter conclusion is potentially worrisome on its own – especially
given the vital role savings banks play in the German economy – future research
would certainly benefit from a better understanding of the social costs of in-
terfering with bank operations for political gain. A natural measure would be
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to compare credit defaults between pre-election and post-election credits. Com-
prehensive loan-level data that would allow to answer these questions does in
principle exist, but is generally not available to researchers. If access to this kind
of data were granted in the future, further extensions of this research would
be possible: For instance, it would be helpful to understand whether the elec-
tion effect works via the extensive (additional credits are extended) or intensive
(larger credits are extended) margin and whether politicians target short-term
or long-term credit to name just two dimensions of interest.
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